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This paper describes an agent-based model of interacting firms, in which interacting firm agents
rationally invest capital and labor in order to maximize payoff. Both transactions and production
are taken into account in this model. First, the performance of individual firms on a real transac-
tion network was simulated. The simulation quantitatively reproduced the cumulative probability
distribution of revenue, material cost, capital, and labor. Then, the response of the firms to a given
exogenous shock, defined as a sudden change of gross domestic product, is discussed. The longer
tail in cumulative probability and skewed distribution of growth rate are observed for a high growth
scenario.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for enterprise risk management, to improve
the business decision making process in a volatile envi-
ronment, has been increasingly recognized. It is essential
to develop a model that can capture various changes in
the business environment by considering the activities of
interacting firms. Many earlier studies in econophysics
have been concerned with the financial market [1, 2], but
relatively few have addressed a fundamental understand-
ing of firm activities, such as derivation of the Pareto law
from the detailed balance condition, and the Gibrat law
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Quantitative discussions with existing
models have concentrated on the power index of wealth
distribution [10, 11, 12].
Existing agent-based firm models that are potentially
extensible to interacting firms are briefly summarized and
their shortcomings are pointed out below. Simple mon-
etary exchange models have been developed by several
authors [13, 14, 15, 16]. A mean-field version of these
models exhibits the stationary distribution of wealth with
a power-law tail for large wealth. The basic idea of this
model, that agents are randomly matched in pairs and try
to catch part of the otherfs wealth, might be problematic
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from an economic point of view [17], despite the mod-
elfs success in reproducing a power-law tail. It is, how-
ever, noted that the random match problem was fixed by
taking into account network structures, such as regular
networks and small-world networks, for neighbor agents
[15].
The gtheft and fraudh nature [18] of the above models
was resolved in a market mediated monetary exchange
model [19]. This model considers a market consisting
of N agents and two goods. Market mediated monetary
exchange is equivalent to maximizing the utility func-
tion of the Cobb-Douglass form. Although the monetary
exchange mechanism between agents is significantly im-
provedCthis model is too simple to capture actual firm
activity. In particular, the aspect of production, which is
the most important economic activity for industrial firms,
is completely ignored. Thus, a market mediated mone-
tary exchange model is still unsatisfactory as a model of
interacting firms.
On the other hand, it is well known in economics liter-
ature that economic activities between industrial sectors,
such as production, can be analyzed by input-output
analysis [20]. Since input-output analysis is basically de-
signed to treat economic activities between industrial sec-
tors, its application to economic activities between firms
requires handling huge sparse matrices, which is compu-
tationally inefficient. In addition, the dynamical aspects
of economic activities are neglected in input-output anal-
ysis. The next section describes our attempt to construct
2a dynamical model of interacting firms incorporating pro-
duction activity.
In this paper, we propose a model of a firm network in
which interacting firm agents invest rationally in capital
and labor in order to maximize payoff. Here, both trans-
actions and production are taken into account, in order to
create a realistic description of industrialized economies.
In the remainder of this paper, the agent-based model
of interacting firms, viewing inter-firm relationships as a
many-body problem, is explained (Section 2). Then, the
contents of firm data is described in Section 3; parameters
estimation and verification of the model are described in
Section 4. Finally, the simulation results for the response
of the firm network to exogenous shock are discussed in
Section 5.
II. MODEL OF INTERACTING FIRMS
A new agent-based model which views inter-firm re-
lationships as a many-body problem is proposed in this
section to resolve the shortcomings of existing models
[21, 22, 23]. It is considered that a firm network con-
sists of interacting N agents, where value is added from
materials to end products through transactions and pro-
duction. It is postulated that past business performance
data is realized as a consequence of the Nash equilibrium,
which means each firm makes investment decisions in or-
der to maximize their payoff under investment decisions
made by the other firms. Payoff Pi of the i
th firm is the
aggregated operating profit:
Pi =
∑
t
{Ri(t)− C
(G)
i (t)− riK
(G)
i (t)− L
(G)
i (t)}, (1)
where Ri(t), C
(G)
i (t), K
(G)
i (t), L
(G)
i (t), and ri are rev-
enue, materials cost, capital, labor, and interest rate for
debt, respectively. The suffix (G) indicates the Nash
equilibrium solution. Revenue R(t) of the ith firm is as-
sumed to be described by the time-evolution equation,
Ri(t+1) = Ri(t)

RGi (t+ 1)
RGi (t)
+ σi
∑
j∈Transaction
fij + σiǫi

 .
(2)
The second term of R.H.S. of Eq. (2) is an interaction
term due to business-to-business transactions, and is a
functional form of the product of the de-trended growth
rate δXi(t) multiplied by the interaction parameter kij ,
fij = −kij(Xj(t)−XGDP (t))/σj . (3)
Here Xj(t) = Rj(t)/Rj(t − 1) and XGDP (t) =
GDP (t)/GDP (t− 1) are the growth rates of Revenue of
the jth firm and gross domestic product (GDP), respec-
tively. Interaction between firms in Eq. (3) is written in
terms of the growth rate of revenue for transacting firms,
and contrasts sharply with the previous model [14], in
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FIG. 1: The internal structure of a firm agent is shown. An
investment decision made by the agent is formulated using
capital and labor.
The 1st agent
The Nth agent
  
1
1
0
K
K
G
'r
  
1
1
0
L
L
G
'r
  
1
1
1
K
TK
G
'r
   
1
1
1
L
TL
G
'r

  
N
G
N
K
K
'r
0   
N
G
N
L
L
'r
0
  
N
G
N
K
TK
'r
1   
N
G
N
L
TL
'r
1
…
…
…
…
FIG. 2: An approximate solution for the Nash equilibrium
is obtained using a genetic algorithm with structure of gene
shown here.
which agents are randomly matched in pairs and try to
catch part of the otherfs wealth.
The internal structure of a firm agent is shown in Fig.
1. An investment decision made by the ith agent is for-
mulated using capital K
(G)
i (t) and labor L
(G)
i (t). Added
value Yi(t) ≡ Ri(t) − Ci(t) corresponding to the Nash
equilibrium Y
(G)
i (t) is calculated using the production
function in terms of capital and labor,
Y
(G)
i (t) = AiK
(G)
i (t)
αiL
(G)
i (t)
βi . (4)
It is empirically known that revenue and material cost are
strongly correlated. These two quantities are assumed to
Listed firm belonging to a conglomerate in Japan
Customer or supplier with revenue larger than 
367740x106 JPY
FIG. 3: A subset of a firm network was extracted by analyz-
ing transaction data.
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be@proportional to added value. Then, material cost
C
(G)
i (t) is calculated using added value corresponding to
the Nash equilibrium Y
(G)
i (t),
C
(G)
i (t) = giY
(G)
i (t). (5)
Revenue corresponding to the Nash equilibrium R
(G)
i (t)
in Eq. (2) is calculated from added value corresponding
to the Nash equilibrium Y
(G)
i (t),
R
(G)
i (t) = f
[
Y
(G)
i (t) + C
(G)
i (t)
]
. (6)
Here f [·] is a function, which does not exceed an upper
limit Si(t) in order to model lower profit for excess supply,
f [x] =
{
S for x ≥ S
x for x < S
. (7)
If firm supplies product beyond demand, the price of the
product falls off. This causes saturation for revenue, but
does not affect cost. As a result, there is lower profit for
excess supply. The upper limit Si(t) is proportional to
GDP,
Si(t) = hiGDP (t). (8)
Each firm has complete knowledge about the past in-
vestments of other firms. This assumption is called gper-
fect informationh. For a finite repeated game with per-
fect information, the Nash equilibrium of pure strategy
is obtained using backward induction [24]. In this model,
an approximate solution for the Nash equilibrium is ob-
tained using a genetic algorithm (GA) [25, 26]. The
structure of gene encoding {K
(G)
i (t), G
(G)
i (t)} is shown
in Fig. 2. The jth firm makes investment decisions
(+∆Ki,+∆Li), or (+∆Ki,−∆Li), or (−∆Ki,+∆Li),
or (−∆Ki,−∆Li) at each time step,
K
(G)
i (t+ 1) = K
(G)
i (t)±∆Ki, (9)
TABLE I: Cases of simulation.
Case Interaction Fitness
Case1 Synchronous-correlation Agg. P
Case2 Synchronous-correlation Rank
Case3 Cross-correlation Agg. P
Case4 Cross-correlation Rank
TABLE II: GA parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of gene 50
Number of generation 100
Prob. of cross-over 6× 10−1
Prob. of mutation 5× 10−3
Fraction of elite 0.1
L
(G)
i (t+ 1) = L
(G)
i (t)±∆Li, (10)
in order to maximize fitness F . The definition of Fitness
F is given,
F =
∑
i
1/(1 +Ranki), (11)
where Ranki is the rank of payoff Pi among M pieces of
genes. Hereafter, Eq. (11) is called grank fitnessh, which
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. For comparison,
another fitness measure is defined,
F =
∑
i
Pi, (12)
which is corresponds to total optimization. Hereafter,
Eq. (12) is called gaggregated payoff fitnessh.
III. FIRM FINANCIAL AND TRANSACTION
DATA
In this section, the attributes of the analyzed firm fi-
nancial and transaction data are described in detail. The
analyzed financial data is Nikkei financial data, which is
part of the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank Sys-
tem. Field items of Nikkei financial data include (a) com-
pany identifiers, (b) balance sheet, (c) income statement,
(d) cash flow statement, and (e) various financial ratios.
TABLE III: Accuracy of simulation.
Case 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Case1 3% 20% 27% 26% 27% 32%
Case2 3% 21% 26% 24% 24% 31%
Case3 3% 21% 22% 26% 29% 41%
Case4 3% 18% 27% 25% 29% 36%
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FIG. 5: Obtained fitness and aggregated profit shows that all simulations reached maximum fitness properly. Cases 1, 2, and
4 approximately reproduced the calculated value of aggregated profit.
The period of record is JFY1965 or later. The number
of firms recorded is approximately 1,400 at JFY2003.
Analyzed transaction data is Nikkei transaction data,
which is part of the Nikkei Economic Electronic Data-
bank System. Field items of Nikkei transaction data
are (a) Name of firm, (b) Stock ticker, (c) Fiscal year,
(d) Type of transaction: supplier or customer, (e) Se-
quential number of transacting firm, and (f) Name of
transacting firm. The period of record is from JFY2000
to JFY2003. The number of firms recorded is approxi-
mately 13,000, and the number of transactions recorded
is approximately 110,000, for each JFY. Thus, each firm
lists an average of eight transactions. While the Nikkei
does not release its collection methods, it appears that
most of these data were obtained by questionnaires and
interviews.
A subset of a firm network was extracted by analyzing
transaction data and is shown in Fig. 3. The extracted
firm network consists of 16 listed firms belonging to a
conglomerate in Japan and those customers and suppli-
ers (79 firms) with revenue greater than 367, 740 × 106
JPY. In the next section, parameter estimations and sim-
ulations are made for this firm network.
IV. PARAMETERS ESTIMATION AND
VERIFICATIONS
Model parameters {ri, σi, kij , Ai, αi, βi, gi, hi,∆Ki,∆Li}
were estimated using financial and transaction data for
firms and GDP data. A comprehensive description of
our parameter estimation can be found in [27]. In this
paper, only the estimation of the interaction parameter
is briefly explained.
If the second term of R.H.S. of Eq. (2) is replaced
by XGDP (t + 1), Eq. (2) can be rewritten in vector
notation using the de-trended growth rate δXj(t) =
(Xj(t)−XGDP (t))/σj as follows:
δX(t+ 1) = −kδX(t) + e. (13)
Here a non-stationary process for revenue is rigorously
considered. The interaction parameter kij can be es-
5timated using multi-regression analysis with Eq. (13).
Hereafter, the interaction parameter estimated with Eq.
(13) is called gcross-correlation interactionh. If Eq. (13)
for the de-trended growth rate δXj(t) is approximated as
a stationary process, the following equation is obtained,
δX(t) = −kδX(t) + e. (14)
Hereafter, the interaction parameter estimated with Eq.
(14) is called gsynchronous-correlation interactionh.
All parameters were estimated with data from JFY
1993 and JFY 2003. Simulations during JFY 1993 and
JFY 2003 were made with the estimated parameters and
initial values of JFY 1993 as verification of the model.
Past GDP data from JFY 1993 to JFY 2003, shown in
Fig. 4, was used as input for the simulation. Four simu-
lation cases were set according to the type of interaction
and fitness, as shown in Table I. Among the four cases,
Case 4 is expected to be the most accurate. Maximiza-
tion of fitness was made using GA for the four cases,
with GA parameters as shown in Table II. Probabilities
of cross-over and mutation and fraction of elite were cho-
sen to obtain the fastest maximization of fitness. The
number of generation was 100 for all cases. Fitness and
aggregated profit is shown as a function of generation in
Fig. 5. Fitness and aggregated profit are identical for
Cases 1 and 3 by definition. Fig. 5 shows that all sim-
ulations reached maximum fitness properly. Aggregated
profit, calculated using past financial data, was 4.3×1013
JPY and compared with simulation results. Fig. 5 shows
that Cases 1, 2, and 4 approximately reproduced the cal-
culated value of aggregated profit. However, simulation
results for Case 3 showed a large deviation from the cal-
culated value using past financial data.
Simulation results of cumulative probability distribu-
tions for revenue, material cost, capital, and labor for
Case 4 were compared with past data in Fig. 6. Con-
siderable deviation is found in the tail part of the distri-
butions for revenue and cost, though agreement is fairly
good for capital and labor. Note that past data of cu-
mulative probability distribution is temporally stable for
capital and labor. If the cumulative probability distribu-
tion of capital and labor is stable, then the cumulative
probability distribution of material cost is stable through
Eqs. (4) and (5) in our model. In fact the simulation re-
sult in Fig. 6 (b) does not vary much with time, although
the data does vary with time. On the other hand, both
of simulation and data vary with time. This deviation
might suggest the need for a time-evolution equation for
cost, like Eq. (2) for revenue.
Simulation results of growth rate of revenue for Case 4
are compared with past data for JFY1994, JFY1998, and
JFY2003. Results are shown in Fig. 7. The left hand
side is the simulation, and the right hand side is past
data. Simulation and data do not agree very well, and
the growth rate distribution is wider for the simulation.
Although a detailed comparison of distribution shapes is
not possible, it seems that growth rate is sensitive for
accuracy.
Accuracy of the simulation was quantified using the
relative error:
∆x(t)
x(t)
= (
1
4T
)1/2


∑
i{
R
(S)
i
(t)−R
(D)
i
(t)
R
(D)
i
(t)
}2+
∑
i{
C
(S)
i
(t)−C
(D)
i
(t)
C
(D)
i
(t)
}2+
∑
i{
K
(S)
i
(t)−K
(D)
i
(t)
K
(D)
i
(t)
}2+
∑
i{
L
(S)
i
(t)−L
(D)
i
(t)
L
(D)
i
(t)
}2


1/2
. (15)
where suffixes (S) and (D) indicate simulation and data,
respectively. Calculated relative error is shown in Table
III. Comparison shows that Case 2 is more accurate than
Case 1, and Case 4 is more accurate than Case 3. This
means that the decision making of individual firms led to
Nash equilibrium, not total optimization. Furthermore,
superiority of the cross-correlation interaction could not
be claimed from comparisons of Case 1 and Case 3, and
of Case 2 and Case 4. This means that de-trended growth
rate using GDP is an approximately stationary process.
V. SIMULATION WITH EXOGENOUS SHOCK
In this section the response of firms to a given exoge-
nous shock, defined as a sudden change of GDP, is dis-
cussed. Three scenarios (high, medium, and low growth)
are given in Fig. 4 for JFY 2003 to JFY 2007 after the ex-
ogenous shock at JFY 2003. Performances of firm agents
for the high and the low growth scenarios were simulated
with initial values from JFY 2003.
Cumulative probability distributions for two scenarios
are shown in Fig. 8. A longer tail in cumulative proba-
bility was clearly observed for the high growth scenario.
In addition, calculated growth rates of revenue for two
scenarios are shown in Fig. 9. Mean, standard devia-
tion, skewness, and kurtosis of growth rate for the high
growth scenario are 1.113, 0.3618, 1.432, and 3.346, re-
spectively. Those for the low growth scenario are 1.101,
0.3273, 0.6320, and 1.007, respectively. This means that
a skewed distribution of growth rate was obtained for the
high growth scenario, as expected.
VI. SUMMARY
An agent-based model of interacting firms, in which in-
teracting firm agents rationally invest capital and labor
in order to maximize payoff, was studied. Both transac-
tions and production are taken into account, to resolve
the shortcomings of existing models.
Cumulative probability and growth rate were simu-
lated in the period, where model parameters were es-
timated. The simulation quantitatively reproduces the
cumulative probability distribution of revenue, material
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FIG. 6: Simulation results of cumulative probability distributions for revenue, material cost, capital, and labor for Case 4 were
compared with past data. Considerable deviation is found in the tail part of the distributions for revenue and cost, though
agreement is fairly good for capital and labor.
cost, capital, and labor. Comparisons between simula-
tions and data show that the decision making of individ-
ual firms led to a Nash equilibrium, not total optimiza-
tion. No apparent difference was observed for two kinds
of interactions. This means that a de-trended growth
rate using GDP is an approximately stationary process.
These comparisons suggest the need for a time-evolution
equation for material cost. Finally, the response of firm
agents to exogenous shock (the high and low growth
scenarios) was simulated. Cumulative probability and
growth rate distribution were compared for two scenar-
ios. A longer tail in cumulative probability and a skewed
distribution of growth rate were observed for the high
growth scenario.
Briefly, our plans for further study are as follows. The
first task concerns the asymmetric treatment of revenue
and material costs, i.e., only revenue is described by the
time-evolution equation and material cost is described
by the production function directly in the current model
(Eqs. (4) and (5)). The need for a time-evolution equa-
tion of material cost is suggested by verification of the
cumulative probability distribution. Consideration of a
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FIG. 8: Cumulative probability for the high and low growth
scenarios at JFY2007 are shown. A longer tail in cumulative
probability was clearly observed for the high growth scenario.
time-evolution equation of material cost is planned in the
next step. The second task concerns the static firm net-
work, i.e., the list of linked firms is obtained by analyzing
the transaction data of a certain fiscal year and is not up-
dated during the simulation. In fact, the functional form
of interaction in Eq. (3) is analogous to the inter-atomic
force of crystal lattice, where the equilibrium position of
the atom is assumed. Interaction without assuming equi-
librium position, such as the Lennard-Jones potential or
the Morse potential, might be required to consider recon-
nection of the firm network. Network analysis of multi-
year transaction data is strongly desired for this purpose.
The search for suitable data and its network analysis is
planned in the next step.
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